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The Orderly Liquidation Authority: The Creditor's Perspective

I. INTRODUCTION
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), has been referred to as "the
strongest financial reform[] this country has considered since the
Great Depression."' This legislation, enacted in response to the
near collapse of the U.S. economy in 2008, contains multiple
aspects of financial reform. 2 One of Dodd-Frank's overarching
purposes is to address systemic fragility in the U.S. economy. As
a primary means of achieving this goal, Title II of Dodd-Frank
established the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), which will
be used to resolve certain failing nonbank financial institutions. A
majority of the debate over the OLA relates to the general
propriety and effectiveness of Title II to decrease systemic risk and
However, another
protect taxpayers from future bailouts.'
important consequence of Title II is its effect on creditors' rights
and interests.
This Note addresses how creditors will likely be affected by
the provisions in Title II. The Note begins by discussing why
financial reform was needed to address systemic risk, and why it
was designed to deal with failures among significant nonbank

1. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Sec'y Timothy Geithner
Remarks on Passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July
15,2010), www.financialstability.gov/latest/pr_07152010.html.
2. See BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY 2
(2010) (discussing areas of reform in Dodd-Frank, including regulation of derivatives
and hedge funds, the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and
changes in bank regulation, among others).
3. See infra Part IV.A; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 204(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1454 (2010) (to be

codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
4. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
5. See infra Part II.B.
6. See infra Part IV.
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financial institutions. The Note goes on to discuss congressional
intent in enacting Title II and argues that protecting creditors'
rights was a subordinate concern to protecting the government's
8
Next, the Note examines Lehman
and taxpayers' interests.
Brothers' bankruptcy and maintains that bankruptcy can still be a
viable and preferable option to the OLA.' Lastly, the Note
explores the differences between Title II provisions and the
Bankruptcy Code, illustrating that the Code provisions are
generally more concerned with the protection of creditors' rights
than Title 11.10 The conclusion is that creditors are less protected
under Title II, and that alternative mechanisms, namely the
bankruptcy system, would provide creditors with more protection
and more equitable outcomes, when companies fail."
II. GOVERNMENT DEBATES ON THE RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS

An Overview of Proposed Legislation

A.

In response to the financial crisis, the Treasury Department
issued proposals for financial reform, including the creation of a
resolution authority, fashioned after the FDIC's authority to
resolve failing banks. 2 Both houses of Congress began working on
their own reform proposals as well.13 The House passed the Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, introduced by
Congressman Barney Frank, in December 2009.14 In May 2010,
the Senate passed the Restoring American Financial Stability Act,

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.

12. DEPT. OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM:
FOUNDATION 8 (2009), available at

A NEW

http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf.
13. MAYER BROWN LLP, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FINANCIAL REFORM
LEGISLATION: THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER

PROTECTION Acr 2 (2010),

http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=9307&nid=6.
14. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. (2009).
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A Joint Conference
introduced by Senator Chris Dodd."
Committee was convened to reconcile the differences between the
bills passed by the two houses, resulting in Dodd-Frank, which was
approved by the House on June 30, by the Senate on July 15, and
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010.16
The resolution system for nonbank financial institutions
crafted in Title II, the OLA, was not the only proposed means of
dealing with failing Systemically Significant Financial Companies
(SSFCs)." Other proposals in Congress, such as H.R. 3310, the
Consumer Protection and Regulatory Enhancement Act, would
resolve SSFCs by creating a new chapter within the Bankruptcy
Code to specifically deal with SSFCs. 8 Vigorous debate between
supporters of the two mechanisms permeates the Congressional
Record of Dodd-Frank. 9 This debate highlights some of the
significant differences and far-reaching implications of each of the
proposed means of dealing with failing financial institutions. 2 0
B.

Bankruptcy or Bailout
1. Congressional Debates

A common theme throughout the congressional debates
was whether or not Title II and the OLA will, in practice, be used
as a government bailout.1 Protecting taxpayers from having to
pay for more bailouts was a primary concern.22 Supporters of Title
15. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong.
(2010).
16. MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 13.
17. See infra Parts II.A-B.
18. DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40928, LEHMAN
BROTHERS AND INDYMAC: COMPARING RESOLUTION REGIMES 1 (2009) [hereinafter
CARPENTER R40928].
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. See, e.g., Transcript of Conference Meeting at 55, House-Senate Conference
Committee Holds a Meeting on the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 111th Congress (2010) (LEXIS) (referring to the proposed OLA, statement by
"Unknown" Congressman that "Where I disagree is that the answer is bailout. The
answer should be bankruptcy.").
22. See, e.g., id. at 116, ("[T]hese conditions on emergency lending do protect tax
payers while preserving a very important tool for dealing with the financial crisis.").
In March 2008, the Fed participated in the bailout of the fifth largest U.S. securities
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II responded that traditional bankruptcy would still be the primary
and preferred means for large financial institutions to unwind, and
that the OLA would only be used if the bankruptcy plan was not
approved by the institution's regulators. 23 The stated goal was to
and
shareholders
while designating
protect taxpayers,
24
management, as "toast." In refuting the bailout accusation, the
House Committee on Financial Services countered that there
would be no bailouts but rather that the company's management,
shareholders, and creditors would pay the price.2
firm, Bear Steams (Bear), through facilitation of its acquisition by JP Morgan Chase
(JP Morgan). The Fed, acting under expanded authority of section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act, initially gave a $30 billion discount window loan to JP Morgan
to extend a line of credit to Bear. The following weekend, the Fed made a $29 billion
ten-year loan to JP Morgan to enable them to acquire Bear. In July 2008, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in conservatorship by the Federal Housing
Finance Agency. By August 2010, the Treasury bought $145 billion in preferred
stock of the two entities, and the Fed and the Treasury bought over $1.6 trillion in
debt and mortgage backed securities from them. AIG, the world's largest insurance
company, was on the verge of insolvency in September 2008, when the Fed exercised
its section 13(3) authority to provide an $85 billion loan in return for preferred stock
and warrants convertible to 79.9% ownership in the company. Ben Bernanke,
Chairman of the Fed, explained that a reason why AIG was bailed out and Lehman
Brothers was not was that "The failure of Lehman Brothers posed risks. But the
troubles at Lehman had been well known for some time .. . and investors clearly
recognized that the failure of the firm was a significant possibility. Thus, we judged
that investors and counterparties had had time to take precautionary measures." FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, GOVERNMENT RESCUES OF "TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL" FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 21-26 (2010), availableat
http://c0181567.cdnl.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/2010-08-

31%2OPreliminary%20Staff%20Report%20Too%2OBig%2OTo%2Fail%20Institutions.pdf [hereinafter FCIC RESCUES].
23. 156 CONG. REC. S5870 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Mark
Warner). see infra Part IV.A.
24. 156 CONG. REC. S5870, 5882 (statement of Sen. Mark Warner) ("Our goal was
twofold: One, taxpayers should never have to bear the risk; and, two, if an entity goes
into liquidation, it will not come out. Liquidation or resolution is not an attempt to
stand up an institution. But we wanted to make clear to shareholders, to
management, if you go into resolution, you are toast. . . .").
25. Wall Street Reform and Consumer ProtectionAct: Myth vs. Facts, OFFICE OF
SPEAKER NANCY PELOSI (Dec. 9, 2009),
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/custom?q=cache:bxtvGwqZfKcJ:reyes.house
.gov/UploadedFiles/Financial
RegulatoryReformMythQA_1209_new.doc+Myths+v.+Facts+Wall+Street+Hou
se&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=google-csbe ("[T]his is no bailout....
These financial institutions will be allowed to fail, but in a way that protects the
economy. Under this authority, as a last resort, federal regulators will shut down
these institutions that pose a risk to the whole economy. They will fire the managers,
fire the executives, wipe out shareholders, sell off the assets, but protect our financial
system and taxpayers from collateral damage. For a market to function, those who
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Many opponents maintained that the "permanent Wall
Street bailout authority" provided for in Dodd-Frank was the
wrong course of action. 26 They alleged that Dodd-Frank would
allow big businesses to get bigger, posing even greater threats,
considering that the safety net of a government bailout would only
promote moral hazard. 27 Their solution: reform the Bankruptcy
Code to better deal with failing financial institutions?" Enhanced
bankruptcy procedures would allegedly "create[ ] a level playing
field between Wall Street and Main Street and would ... assure[]

[that] all parties know the rules of the game ahead of time."2 9
Responding to that suggestion, supporters argued that the orderly
liquidation was preferable to bankruptcy because it would not
allow failing institutions to linger in Chapter 11; rather, failing
institutions would fail and be liquidated.3 0
Opponents further argued that the liquidation authority
provisions would only create more confusion and uncertainty for
market participants. 3 1 First, they alleged that the government
would have discretion to "pick winners and losers" in deciding
which firms would be liquidated.32 Second, the very possibility of
two potential options for dealing with SSFCs would result in chaos
in the financial markets." They argued that this uncertainty would
result in an overall decline in investing and would create confusion
for investors, counterparties, and others." Finally, some suggested
that the fate of creditors would be subject to discretionary

invest and lend in that market must know that their money is actually at risk.
Institutions and investors must be responsible for their decisions.").
26. See 156 CONG. REc. H5223, 5225 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Hensarling).
27. See id. at 5226 (statement of Rep. Capito).
28. Id. at 5225 (statement of Rep. Hensarling) ("Republicans believe in the
Bankruptcy Code. [Although,] [t]here are improvements that need to be made ...
29. Id. at 5226 (statement of Rep. Capito).
30. Id. at 5225 (statement of Rep. Perlmutter).
31. See id. at 5226 (statement of Rep. Garrett) ("[O]ne of the major fundamental
flaws of this 2,300-page bill is the section that basically empowers government
bureaucrats with so-called resolution authority to basically pick winners and losers
again, to continue that failed bailout philosophy.").
32. See 156 CONG. REc. H5223, 5226 (Statement of Rep. Garrett).
33. See id. at 5225 (Statement of Rep. Garrett).
34. See id. (Statement of Rep. Garrett).
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government authority, which may be used to unfairly benefit
politically favored unsecured creditors."
Opponents also alleged that the bankruptcy system is
preferable because it is open, transparent, and has clear rules,
precedents, and a judge, which ensure fairness. 36 Additionally, the
bankruptcy system does not itself fund the liquidations of
debtors. On the other hand, a government resolution may take
place "behind closed doors," using discretionary action, and
utilizing government funds to pay creditors as it sees fit.3 1
2. Expert Opinion
The May 6, 2009 hearing on regulating and resolving
institutions considered "too big to fail" before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is also
instructive in surmising the purpose and intent of Congress in
establishing the OLA. Sheila Bair, Chairman of the FDIC, stated
that one of the key solutions to financial reform would be creating
a resolution authority to deal with nonbank financial institutions
posing systemic risk." However, her proposal had several caveats.
She asserted that in order to maintain the credibility of the system,
an independent entity, similar to the FDIC, should be created to
35. See id. (statement of Rep. Garrett ) ("We've seen the rule of law trampled
when the Federal Government bullied into submission secured creditors in the
Chrysler situation. In favor of whom? Well, politically favored unsecured
creditors."). Although it is outside the scope of this Note, some commentators and
parties involved in the bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors accused the
White House of using political pressure and the media to ultimately subordinate
senior priority claims to certain junior claims; Declan McCullough, Chrysler
7, 2009,
May
Dirty Politics, CBSNEWS.COM,
Bankruptcy Exposes
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/05/07/politics/otherpeoplesmoney/main4997900.
shtml?tag=mncol;lst;4.
36. 156 CONG. REC. H4289, 4289 (daily ed. June 9, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Bachus).
37. Id. (statement of Rep. Bachus).
38. Id. (statement of Rep. Bachus) ("By contrast, the resolution authority
proposed by the Democrats would be carried out entirely behind closed doors with
no guarantee of adequate stakeholder and protection and without a bankruptcy judge
to ensure a fair and equitable outcome.").
39. See Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered "Too Big to Fail":
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong.

(2009) [hereinafter Regulating].
40. See id. at 3 (statement of Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
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handle resolution of SSFCs in the quickest and cheapest fashion.41
Additionally, to be effective, a resolution fund paid by assessments
on SSFCs needed to be created.42 Finally, to ensure fairness,
provisions needed to be in place for a clear payment priority
system."43 Bair further elaborated that bankruptcy was ineffective
to deal with SSFCs because of (1) the inability to set up a bridge
financial company (BFC) after filing for bankruptcy;" (2) the
possibility that firms would discontinue operations during
liquidation; and (3) the preferential treatment given to parties with
derivatives contracts under the Code.45
Gary Stearn, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, stated that in order to address the too big to fail
problem, unsecured creditors would have to be dealt with.46 He
explained that when creditors believe that a financial institution
will be bailed out, they are less likely to monitor their investments,
and risk-taking will be underpriced.47 Under-priced risk allows an
institution to take on more risk than it can really handle." Rather
than let these institutions fail, Congress bailed them out,
confirming creditor expectations.49 Stearn endorsed the policy of
explicitly putting the creditors of SSFCs at the risk of loss, to

41. See id. at 4 (statement of Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
42. See id. (statement of Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
43. See id. (statement of Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
44. Dodd-Frank allows the FDIC to create a bridge financial company, to which
it can sell or transfer assets and liabilities of the CFC. MAYER BROWN LLP, supra
note 13, at 36. A BFC is a beneficial tool for the FDIC because it can be used to hold
any part of the CFC worth keeping until it can be sold at a fair price or efficiently
liquidated. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD FRANK WALL
ST. REFORM AND CONSUMER PROT. Acr 27 (2010),
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870b7cO25ed2ecflPresentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-be-4e9a-ba77f786fb90464a/070910_FinancialReformSummary.pdf.
45. See Regulating, supra note 39, at 12 (statement of Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp.). By contrast, a resolution authority could be empowered to
decide whether to accept or reject those derivatives contracts receiving preferential
treatment under the Code.
46. See id. at 6 (statement
Minneapolis).
47. See id. at 4 (statement
Minneapolis).
48. See id. (statement of Gary
49. See id. (statement of Gary

of Gary Stearn, Pres., Fed. Reserve Bank of
of Gary Steam, Pres., Fed. Reserve Bank of
Steam, Pres., Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis).
Stearn, Pres., Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis).
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influence their risk-taking behavior from the outset.50 Both Bair
and Stearn advocated a resolution authority as opposed to the
bankruptcy process for dealing with SSFCs."
Treasury officials have stated that a resolution authority
provides the government with a "stick" by means of the threat of
involuntary takeover and liquidation, as opposed to the "carrot" of
a bailout. 52 It also provides statutory authority for the government
to intervene and commence an orderly wind-up. In response to
this assertion, bankruptcy experts, David Skeel and Kenneth
Ayotte, noted that while a resolution authority might theoretically
have an advantage by allowing for earlier intervention, in the case
of failed or failing banks, the FDIC has generally not exercised its
authority in that manner.54 Rather, failing banks have been
routinely bailed out to avoid creditor losses and a "contagion
effect" among other banks. This predictable FDIC behavior has
incentivized investors to lend more to systemically significant
institutions rather than those that are not systemically significant,
and thus would not be bailed out. 6 Skeel and Ayotte concluded
that the effect of an "expanded resolution regime" would be to
"institutionaliz[e] the recent bailout policy, . . . [and] spur the

continued creation of institutions that are too big and
interconnected to fail."57
Some suggest that the Bankruptcy Code would not be
effective at addressing systemic risk.5 A resolution authority may
50. See id. at 5 (statement of Gary Steam, Pres., Fed. Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis).
51. See Regulating, supra note 39, at 6 (statement of Gary Stearn, Pres., Fed.
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
52. Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP.
L. 469, 497 (2010).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Id. at 498.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, STATEMENT OF SHEILA C. BAIR,
CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, ON SYSTEMICALLY
IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS AND THE ISSUE OF "Too BIG TO FAIL" BEFORE THE
12-13 (2010), available at
COMMISSION
INQUIRY
CRISIS
FINANCIAL
[hereinafter FCIC BAIR]
http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0902-Bair.pdf

(explaining that bankruptcy is insufficient for financial institutions because the
bankruptcy court has little experience with the resolution of a financial firm, it cannot
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effectively address systemic risk, but it may be inadequate to
handle complex insolvencies and may not be protective enough of
creditors.59 A third alternative, suggested by Ayotte and Skeel, is a
hybrid approach to allow SSFCs to file for bankruptcy, while also
providing either rescue loans or a government guarantee for
particularly vulnerable assets.
III. LEHMAN BROTHERS: CAN CREDITORS ACTUALLY BENEFIT
WHEN A FAILED FINANCIAL INSTITUTION USES THE BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM?

A.

What Happened to Lehman Brothers?

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman) was a global
financial institution involved in numerous financial activities in
forty different countries with multiple subsidiaries and affiliates.
Lehman was not bailed out during the financial crisis, but was
instead allowed to fail. 62 On September 15, 2008, Lehman filed for
bankruptcy. 63 That day, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
dropped 504 points, the greatest drop since September 11, 2 00 1 .6
A closer look at aspects of the Lehman bankruptcy
demonstrates some of the real world benefits and detractions of
bankruptcy for the creditors involved in the collapse of an SSFC.65
At least nineteen of Lehman's subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11
work with the financial regulators prior to the failure, it is unable to provide
comparable extensive pre-planning to provide for continuous critical operations, and
it cannot ensure timely acquisition of the failed entity with minimal economic
impact); infra Part IV.B 1.
59. See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40530, INSOLVENCY OF
BANKRUPTCY
COMPANIES:
FINANCIAL
SIGNIFICANT
SYSTEMICALLY
CONSERVATORSHIP/RECEIVERSHIP 4,8 (2009) [hereinafter CARPENTER R40530].

VS.

60. See Ayotte & Skeel Jr., supra note 52, at 496. An in depth analysis of this
hybrid alternative is outside the scope of this paper. However, considering that both
bankruptcy and a resolution authority appear to have inadequacies when it comes to
resolving SSFCs, a mechanism that blends the best attributes of each system in the
case of SSFCs may ultimately be the best option. See infra Part IV (discussing various
pros and cons of bankruptcy and the OLA for dealing with SSFCs with regards to
creditors' interests).
61. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 7.
62. Id.
63. FCIC RESCUES, supra note 22, at 24.
64. Id.
65. See CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 7.
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bankruptcy, and over 60,000 claims were filed against Lehman and
its subsidiaries (collectively "Debtors")." Some debtors were
subject to other nation's insolvency laws, some avoided insolvency
and have reemerged under new names, and some were acquired by
other entities. 7 Lehman's North American businesses were
largely acquired by Barclays,6 and its entities in Asia, the Middle
East, and Europe were purchased by a Japanese investment bank,
Nomura.
B.

Lehman's Bankruptcy Proceeding

The handling of such a complex bankruptcy was facilitated
by certain features unique to the Bankruptcy Code.70 First, 11
U.S.C. § 364's Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) provision allows the
debtor to continue operations, so that those Lehman entities with
going concern value71 or those that were not insolvent could
successfully recover from the parent company's collapse.7 2 By
contrast, there are no DIP provisions under the OLA, and
furthermore, there is no option to reorganize. 71
Second, 11 U.S.C. § 363 allowed Barclays to provide
Lehman with DIP financing,74 free and clear of almost all liens and

66. Id. at 7.
67. Id. at 8.

68. Id. at 16-17. Barclays also provided Lehman $500 million DIP loan so that
Lehman could continue operations during the sale. Id.
69. Ayotte & Skeel Jr., supra note 52, at 481-82.
70. See infra Part III.B.
71. A DIP is a debtor who remains in control of the assets and of the
reorganization of an entity in a Chapter 11 reorganization. The "ordinary course" of
business continues, controlled by the DIP. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c) (2006). "Going concern
value" means that a company will be worth more to creditors and shareholders if it
reorganizes in Chapter 11 and continues to operate, rather than if it were to liquidate.
See id. § 1101.
72. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 16-17.
73. See infra Part IV.B.8.
74. DIP financing allows the debtor to borrow money from new creditors, giving
the new creditors priority over pre-bankruptcy creditors, in order to continue
business operations and to attempt to successfully emerge from a Chapter 11
reorganization. Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank
Insolvency Regimes: A Comparison and Evaluation, 2 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 143, 162
(2007). Additionally, the DIP can sell assets free and clear of all liens, with
distribution proceeds from the sale of the bankruptcy estate's assets going to pay the
other creditors. Ayotte & Skeel Jr., supra note 52, at 476.
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liabilities, and according Barclays priority over pre-petition debts."
76
Such financing is typically not possible outside of bankruptcy.
Third, the automatic stay, often viewed as a debtor
protection, also helps to ensure fair treatment of similarly situated
creditors by prohibiting a race to the courthouse or an attempt to
Particularly
grab the debtor's assets before other creditors.
where there are a large number of creditors and extensive assets
and liabilities at stake, as was the case with Lehman, the automatic
stay affords the bankruptcy court and interested parties time to
"collect and validate claims, to determine the best way to dispose
of assets in an orderly, non-fire sale manner, and to treat all like
priority creditors equally. Stays prevent creditor runs and keep
contracts in force.

. .

. This facilitates the coordination of creditor

claims." The automatic stay thus ensures better treatment for all
creditors.
Many qualified financial contracts (QFCs) are excepted
from the automatic stay through the Bankruptcy Code's "safeParties to these QFCs are able to
harbor protections.""
78

75. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 16-17. Pre-petition debts are those

debts incurred prior to a debtor's bankruptcy filing See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
76. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 16-17.

77. The automatic stay goes into effect at the time of a bankruptcy filing and
stops all collection actions against the debtor, the debtor-in-possession, and the
property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362. Additionally, secured creditors can file to

have the automatic stay lifted, and the burden will be on the DIP to show that the
creditor has "adequate protection." Id. § 362(g).
78. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 18 (quoting Robert R. Bliss and
George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency: An Economic
Comparison and Evaluation, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO (2006), available at
The
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/workingpapers/wp2006_01.pdf).

Bankruptcy Code includes explicit rules of priority whereby administrative expenses
of the trustee will receive priority payment, followed by secured claims, then general
unsecured creditors, with limited exceptions. 11 U.S.C. § 507.
79. See supra Part III.B.

80. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 18. The Bankruptcy Code provides for
an exception to the automatic stay to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a securities
contract in 11 U.S.C. § 555 and for a commodities contract or forward contract in 11
U.S.C. § 556, for swap agreements in 11 U.S.C. § 560, for repurchase agreements in
11 U.S.C. § 559, and for master netting agreements in 11 U.S.C. § 561. See infra Part
IV.B.4. QFC exemption from the automatic stay is generally believed to reduce
systemic risk. In a fast-paced market, a party to one of these QFCs may need the
proceeds from the transaction at issue to pay off other transactions. Thus,
prohibiting closing out the contract with the party in bankruptcy could have a ripple
effect on the financial market. Norman Carleton, Bankruptcy and Close-Out Netting
of Financial Products, WASHINGTON OUTSIDE (Apr. 25, 2010, 4:12 PM),
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circumvent the stay by affording a unique right to automatically
terminate the contract or liquidate the collateral on their claim,
once a party has defaulted or filed for bankruptcy - acts generally
prohibited by the automatic stay." While utilizing these provisions
added to the complexity of the Lehman case and was likely
harmful to DIP operations and possibly to other creditors not
holding QFCs, the safe-harbors proved advantageous to many
holders of QFCs. 82 Additionally, the special treatment of QFCs
helped avoid disruption of the financial markets, an unlikely result
had certain counterparties not been able to terminate their
contracts.
C.

Outcomes for Lehman's Creditors

The outcome and implications of the Lehman failure and
bankruptcy are debatable. Ben Bernanke stated in a 60 Minutes
interview, "[people said] 'Let 'em fail.' You know, 'It's not a
problem. The markets will take care of it.' And I think I knew
better than that. And Lehman proved that you cannot let a large
internationally active firm fail in the middle of a financial crisis."8
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner described the Lehman
insolvency as causing "catastrophic damage" to the financial
system.8 Many pointed to the government's failure to intervene
and bail out Lehman as the tipping point of the financial crisis.8
http://washingtonoutside.blogspot.com/2010/04/bankruptcy-and-close-out-nettingof.html.
81. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 18-19.
82. See CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 19-20.
83. See Ayotte & Skeel, Jr., supra note 52, at 494-95. Lehman used its own
modified system for dealing with QFCs, with holders of QFCs that were fully
collateralized having the best prospect for recovery. While it was beneficial to give
certain holders of QFCs the ability to close-out their contracts, the simultaneous
closing out of all QFCs to which Lehman was a party could have also caused chaos in
the derivatives market. Either way, the special treatment of QFCs in Lehman's case
appears to have been linked to avoiding systemic disruption of the markets. Id. at
494-96.
84. 60 Minutes: Ben Bernanke's Greatest Chal!cnge (CBS television broadcast
Mar. 15, 2009), availableat
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/12/60minutes/main4862191.shtml.
85. This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast Mar. 29,
2009), available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=7200273&page=4.
86. Ayotte & Skeel, Jr., supra note 52, at 470.
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Others have argued that the mere prospect that Lehman's failure
could have devastating effects on the economy was a self-fulfilling
prophecy, noting that the combination of this fear, along with
other bank and SSFC failures, were actually all factors to blame,
rather than the bankruptcy system itself. 7
One downside of using bankruptcy in Lehman's case
resulted from the complexity of Lehman's operations combined
with the adversarial nature of a court proceeding." Numerous
claimants and parties of interest disputed and fought over the
allocation of Lehman's assets, resulting in delays in the payment of
creditors.89 The impact of the Lehman bankruptcy on its creditors
depended in part on the type of investment held by each creditor.
For example, holders of commercial paper issued by Lehman
(which is usually a safer investment because of its short maturity)
became unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy case, with low
prospects for substantial returns on their investments, while
certain holders of OFCs fared well." Some Lehman entities were
able to avoid insolvency or were bought out by other entities, and
were presumably able to continue to pay their creditors. 91 Many of
the unsecured creditors of liquidated Lehman entities likely
received a smaller, pro rata portion of their claims.92 The payment
of many claims was delayed.93 An assessment of the treatment of
creditors in the Lehman bankruptcy appears to result in mixed
conclusions as to whether creditors received favorable outcomes.
The use of bankruptcy had two other negative impacts on
Lehman's resolution: extensive costs and attorney's fees as well as
prolonged litigation. 94 The litigation has been ongoing for over
two years, and as of October, 2010, Lehman's bankruptcy has cost
around $2 billion, with over 1,300 people having worked on the

87. Ayotte & Skeel, Jr., supra note 52, at 472.
88. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 20.
89. See id.
90. Ayotte & Skeel, Jr., supra note 52, at 489; See infra Part III.B.
91. See CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 8.

92. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2006); Ayotte & Skeel, Jr., supra note 52, at 495..
93. See infra Part III.C.
94. Telis Demos, Lehman's US Bankruptcy Costs Top $1b, FIN. TIMES,
November 23, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/39d642a0-f699-lldf-b43400144feab49a.html#axzzlDliOvBcC.
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case.' However, Bryan Marsal, a member of the restructuring
firm working for Lehman, and the chief executive of Lehman's
estate responded that, "[t]he strategy of managing and
maximi[z]ing the value of assets rather than liquidating quickly at
fire sale values takes time and requires fees . .. but it will yield far

greater returns for the creditors than all the costs of personnel and
legal and professional services combined."9
The Bankruptcy Code provisions discussed above clearly
worked to the advantage of creditors.9 However, for creditors,
negative aspects of the bankruptcy process include the potential
for only partial payment on claims and possible delays in claim
payment.98 The successes and failures of the Lehman bankruptcy
indicate that the bankruptcy system is advantageous to creditors in
many ways in resolving SSFCs. 99 However, the over-arching
question of whether the bankruptcy court is the best forum to
resolve issues of such complex financial nature remains. Instead of
creating a new resolution mechanism, the better option is perhaps
to preserve the aspects of bankruptcy that work, and then make
changes to improve the bankruptcy process for failed or failing
SSFCs.
IV. TITLE II OF THE DODD FRANK ACT AS IT RELATES TO
CREDITORS

A.

Brief Summary of Title II

The OLA provides in part for the forced liquidation of
certain SSFCs, deemed to be failing or on the verge of failing.'0o
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), established by
Dodd-Frank, will identify as SSFCs those nonbank financial
companies which it deems to pose a significant threat to the U.S.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra Part III.B.
98. See supra Part III.C.
99. See supra Part III.B.
100. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 203(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1450-51 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
5383).
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economy.o These financial companies must be predominantly
engaged in activities that are financial in nature, as defined in
section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act.'02 Excluded from
this provision are Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, any Federal Home
Loan Bank, any Farm Credit System, and any other government
entity.103 SSFCs are required to submit "living wills" or plans for
their own rapid and orderly resolution under the Bankruptcy
The plan must detail how the resolution will be
Code.'"
accomplished without posing systemic risk.' 5 If these SSFCs do
not submit a credible plan, then the FDIC and the Federal
Reserve Board may impose requirements that ultimately lead to
the divestiture of assets and operations.'06
Firms subject to the OLA and thus eligible to be placed in
receivership are designated Covered Financial Companies
(CFCs).' CFCs are those financial companies which are found to
meet certain requirements.'8 The FDIC and the Board of
Governors must first recommend to the Treasury Secretary that
the financial company poses a systemic risk.0 o Two-thirds of the
members of the Board of Directors of the FDIC and two-thirds of
the members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors are
required to vote to recommend that the Treasury Secretary

101. Id. § 113 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323).
102. Id. § 102(a)(4), (6) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311)..
103. See id. §201(a)(11)(C) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5381).
104. Id. §165(d)(1), (4) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).; MAYER BROWN,
supra note 13, at 23 (referring to these resolution plans as "living wills").
105. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 112(a)(2)(I), 165(d) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. H§ 5322,
5365).
106. Id. §165(d)(5)(A) (to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
107. Id. § 201(a)(8) (to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 5381). Non-financial subsidiaries of
CFCs are excluded from Dodd-Frank Title II as well as subsidiaries that are insured
depository institutions or insurance companies. Id. § 201(a)(9); see also id. § 201(11)
(defining financial company to exclude non-financial in nature subsidiaries by
omission). Stockbrokers who are not members of SIPC as well as commodity
brokers will be liquidated by the FDIC in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code.
DAVIS POLK LLP, supra note 44, at 31. Subsidiaries of a CFC are also subject to Title
II receivership provisions if they are financial in nature, are in default or danger of
default, if their liquidation would mitigate serious harm to the U.S. economy, and
their liquidation would facilitate the liquidation of the CFC. Dodd-Frank Act, §
210(a)(1)(E)(i) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5390).
108. Id. § 203(b)(1)-(7) (to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 5383).
109. Id. § 203(a)(1)(A).
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appoint the FDIC as receiver."o This recommendation is to be
based on several factors: (1) whether the entity is in default or
danger of default;"' (2) the effect that a default would have on
United States financial stability; (3) a finding that bankruptcy is
inappropriate, the likelihood of a private sector alternative to
avoid default; and (4) an evaluation of the effect on creditors,
shareholders, and counterparties if the FDIC were appointed as

receiver.112
Upon receiving such a recommendation, the Treasury
Secretary is empowered, in consultation with the President, and
after the Secretary makes the necessary determinations, to appoint
the FDIC as a receiver, in order to liquidate failing nonbank
financial companies.
After receiving the recommendation, the
Secretary is to determine: (1) whether the financial company is in
default or danger of default; (2) whether the failure of the financial
company would have serious adverse effects on the U.S. economy;
(3) that there is no viable private sector alternative; (4) the effect
on the financial company's creditors, counterparties and
shareholders is appropriate given the benefit to the U.S. economy;
and (5) the orderly liquidation will avoid the harmful
consequences of the financial company to proceeding under
114
applicable insolvency laws.
If the Secretary finds that the entity
meets these requirements, then the Secretary may appoint the
FDIC as the receiver.
110. Id. In the case of a broker or a dealer, the Federal regulators who make the
recommendation to the Secretary are the Federal Reserve Board and the Securities
and Exchange Commission. For an insurance company, the recommendation is made
by the Federal Reserve Board and the Director of the Federal Insurance Office. Id. §
203(a)(1)(B), (C).
111. An SSFC will be in default or in danger of default if it has or is likely to file
for bankruptcy, it has or is likely to deplete substantially all of its capital, it is balance
sheet insolvent, or it is unable to pay its obligations as they come due. Id. §
203(c)(4)(A)-(D). An SSFC will be in default or in danger of default if it has or is
likely to file for bankruptcy, it has or is likely to deplete substantially all of its capital,
it is balance sheet insolvent, or it is unable to pay its obligations as they come due. Id.
112. Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a)(2)(A)-(H), (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5383).
113. Id. § 203(b).
114. Id. § 203(b)(1)-(7).
115. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(i) (to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 5382). However, if the board
of directors of the company does not agree to the receivership, then they have a right
of review in the District Court for the District of Columbia, who will employ an
arbitrary and capricious standard to review the decision. Id. § 202(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iv).
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The OLA is to first be funded by the disposition of the
CFC's assets.' 1 6 All funding acquired by the FDIC to facilitate the
liquidation of the CFC will receive priority in payment." The
FDIC may borrow limited amounts from the Treasury to
intermittently fund the liquidation."" These Treasury funds are to
be repaid through the disposition of the CFC's assets or through
assessments.11 9 If the disposition of assets provides insufficient
funding for repayment, then assessments may be made on certain
entities and financial companies. 20 Assessments are to be made
first on claimants who received additional payment from the FDIC
during the liquidation, beyond what other similarly situated parties
received. 1 2' The recoupment from these claimants will be the
difference in the amount the claimant received and the amount
they would have been entitled to receive from the proceeds of the
CFC liquidation. 22 If these assessments are insufficient to repay
Treasury funds, then BHCs with assets in excess of $50 billion as
well as nonbank financial companies supervised by the Board of
123
Governors may be subject to risk-based assessments.
The OLA is modeled after the resolution authority given to
the FDIC to resolve failing banks under FDIA, with several key
differences.124 Bankruptcy or other insolvency laws are intended to
still be the primary means of resolving financial companies, with
the OLA used as a last resort.125
116. See id. § 210(n)(1)-(2) (to be codified 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
117. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(d) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
118. Id. § 210(n)(1), (6).
119. Id. § 210(n)(9)(B)(i)(I)-(II). There is a concern that the Treasury's provision
of funds to the FDIC as receiver may still be viewed as a bailout, although it is
intended to be temporary, limited in amount and repaid. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, ANALYSIS OF THE ORDERLY LIQUIDATION
AUTHORITY, TITLE II OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL ST. REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROT. Acr 14 (2010)
http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/FSRAAnalysisOrderlyLiquidationAuthor
ity.pdf [hereinafter SKADDEN].
120. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(o)(1)(D)(i) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 210(o)(1)(D)(i)(I), (II).
124. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 44, at 23.
125. The intended use of the OLA as a last resort is apparent because of the
requirement that an assessment has been made that the Bankruptcy Code is
inappropriate and that there is no viable private sector alternative. See SKADDEN,
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Title II ProvisionsRelating to Creditorsand a Comparison
to the Bankruptcy Code
1. Goals of the Resolution Regime

The underlying purpose of Title II is to put the loss and
responsibility for failing institutions on creditors, shareholders, and
the institutions themselves, so as to mitigate serious harm to the
U.S. economy and avoid taxpayer and FDIC loss.126
An overall objective of the OLA in asset disposition is to
protect the FDIC's own interest in recovering disbursements made
by it on behalf of the CFC during the liquidation.' This in turn
will reduce the threat that taxpayers will ultimately foot the bill.'
As such, the guiding principle will be the "least-cost resolution."129
A second objective is to minimize the impact of the failure or
liquidation on the U.S. economy."3
By contrast, the underlying purpose of the bankruptcy
system is to maximize value available to creditors and to equitably
distribute assets (in a Chapter 7), or to restructure and restore a
debtor to financial solvency through a reorganization (in a Chapter
11).'3' Bankruptcy law is not concerned with systemic risk, but
rather focuses on the relationships and outcomes for the debtors

and creditors involved.132
2. Initiation of Proceedings
Under the OLA, the FDIC will be appointed as receiver
and will commence liquidation proceedings, possibly even before

supra note 119, at 5-6.

126. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
127. See id. § 204(d).
128. See CARPENTER R40530, supranote 59, at 4.
129. Least-cost resolution means that because the federal government's money is
at stake, through its role as receiver, it will try to liquidate the CFC as quickly and
cheaply as possible. This may result in an intentional effort to pay creditors as little
as is permissible under the law. See id.
130. Dodd-Frank Act § 204(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
131. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 153-54.
132. CARPENTER R40530, supra note 59, at 4.
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the CFC is actually insolvent.13 Creditors have no right to initiate
The ability for the FDIC to
liquidation under Title II.'
preemptively take control of a CFC may be beneficial in that it
may act as a stop-loss, preventing losses to the company and its
creditors.'
Quick takeover of a CFC will prevent management
from taking risks to salvage the company, which could result in
further losses to the creditors. 3 6
Bankruptcy may be initiated voluntarily by a debtor, or
However, bankruptcy
involuntarily, by a debtor's creditors.1'
cannot be preemptively initiated; instead, creditors must typically
wait for the company to be in default. 1 38 A creditor's option to
initiate the bankruptcy may give them a strategic advantage by
providing leverage in pre-bankruptcy negotiations, and may allow
them to better prepare for their claims in bankruptcy.
Debtors who wish to avoid involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings may be more apt to pay their creditors.
Additionally, the creditor can file an involuntary bankruptcy
petition in order to take advantage of certain Bankruptcy Code
**
140
provisions.
3. Timeliness
The duration of an orderly liquidation versus a bankruptcy
will also affect creditors.14 ' Title II provides for a three-year limit
on the appointment of the FDIC as receiver, subject to two one-

133. See Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383); supra Part
IV.A (discussing the requirements for the FDIC to be appointed as receiver of a

CFC).
134. See Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5383); supra Part
IV.A.
135. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 166.
136. Id.
137. 11 U.S.C. H§ 301(a), 303(b) (2006).
138. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 166.
139. See id.
140. For example, the automatic stay provision could prevent a judgment creditor
from foreclosing on a debtor's otherwise unencumbered assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
Creditors could also seek to have a trustee appointed to oversee and manage a
debtor's property and business, in the case of suspected misconduct. See id. §H
1104(a), 1106.
141. See supra Part IV.B.3.
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year extensions.14 A goal of the OLA is, however, to achieve a
speedy resolution.14 An expedited resolution mechanism may
allow claims to be paid in a manner that minimizes loss of value.
The duration of bankruptcy proceedings varies.
Resolutions in bankruptcy court are never immediate.'4 ' The
adversarial process in the bankruptcy court, the participation of
various parties in interest, the ability to appeal, and the possibility
of reorganization, will likely result in a slower process. 4 6 For
creditors whose interests are based on short-term investments, or
who are themselves facing immediate financial difficulties, this can
The OLA may therefore be
be a devastating prospect.147
advantageous by providing a consistently fast resolution process
and thus more timely payout to creditors.
4. The Automatic Stay
The OLA does not provide for an automatic stay and is not
focused on affording creditors the opportunity to negotiate and
organize their claims.149 Rather the focus is simply on the orderly
wind-up of the company so as to effectuate the least-cost
resolution policy.so Although there is no automatic stay, QFCs
142. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 202(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1447-48 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382).
143. SKADDEN, supra note 119, at 10 (reasoning that the purpose of a broad grant
of authority to the FDIC is necessary to facilitate fast resolutions and to preserve
value of a company in receivership).
144. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 169.
145. Id.
146. See CARPENTER R40530, supra note 59, at 12.
147. See FCIC BAIR, supra note 58. For example, Lehman was the primary broker
for around one hundred hedge funds. When Lehman entered bankruptcy, those
hedge funds were frozen. This caused Lehman (and its creditors) to be unable to
complete transactions and access sources of liquidity, demonstrating the particular
dependence of financial firms on short-term investments and the devastating market
effects of a freeze on those investments. Id.
148. This assertion is debatable and is likely case specific. For example, the sale of
certain Lehman assets to Barclays was arranged three days after Lehman filed for
bankruptcy, and then was approved by a court hearing. Ayotte & Skeel, Jr., supra
note 52, at 481. However, the adversarial nature of bankruptcy and the "vast judicial
wrangling" over some of Lehman's other assets led to delays in paying out some
claims. CARPENTER R40928, supra note 18, at 20.
149. See CARPENTER R40530, supra note 59, at 10.
150. See CARPENTER R40530, supra note 59, at 4, 10.
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still receive special treatment under the OLA and can be closed
out or accelerated by the counterparty"' However, the right to
close out QFCs is limited in Title II by a one business day stay
provision, during which the FDIC can transfer all of a
counterparty's QFCs to a third party or to a BFC, ending all
termination or acceleration rights of the counterparty. Damages
arising from such action will be based on the later date of
repudiation of the QFC as opposed to the date of the FDIC
The OLA also recognizes setoff rights but allows the
takeover.
FDIC to transfer liabilities to BFCs or third parties, even to the
detriment of mutually offsetting claims.154 To make up for this loss,
a claimant harmed by these actions receives priority over other
general creditors.'
In bankruptcy, the automatic stay for QFCs is not subject
to a one-day stay. 56 Rather, the Bankruptcy Code applies the
automatic stay to all contractual agreements, with the exception of
The Bankruptcy Code generally recognizes setoff
QFCs.'
rights." 8 The lack of an automatic stay under the OLA is harmful
to creditors because it eliminates the window of time during which
creditors can organize their claims without fear of assets being
disposed of in the meantime.159 Additionally, the one business day
stay on QFCs under the OLA is detrimental to those creditors that
are parties to those contracts.'6 The potential for setoff rights to
be destroyed is an additional negative consequence for creditors
under the OLA.1' The lack of a similar automatic stay provision
in Title II may, however, allow for a quicker resolution.

151. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 204(c)(8), 124 Stat. 1376, 1481 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
152. Id. § 210(c)(10)(B)(i).
153. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 44, at 30.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 30-31.
156. Id. at 30.
157. Id. at 29.
158. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2006).
159. See supra Part IV.B.4.
160. Supra Part IV.B.4.
161. Supra Part IV.B.4.
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5. Claim Assessment
Upon appointment as receiver, the FDIC will succeed to all
rights of the company, including management and shareholder
rights.m The receiver is empowered to determine all claims in
accordance with Title II.163 The receiver will allow any claim
timely received, which is "prove[n] to the satisfaction of the
receiver."'6 This provision basically gives the FDIC unilateral
authority to review and allow or disallow claims.16 1 Creditors
disputing the FDIC's claim determination can file suit on a claim
in U.S. District Court.'6
In the FDIC's resolution of banks, they typically will
replace all senior management and officers, and creditors will have
no input on how claim distribution and asset disposition decisions

162. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 210(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1461 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §
5390). The FDIC has issued a proposed rule on the treatment of creditor claims.
This proposed rule includes, among other things, a ban on "additional payments to
holders of long-term senior debt, subordinated debt, or equity interests" that causes
them to receive better treatment than similarly situated creditors. Also, all additional
payments must first be voted on by the FDIC Board of Directors. Press Release,
Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., PR-224-2010, FDIC Board Issues Proposed Rule on Claims
Process Under New Resolution Authority (October 12, 2010), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10224.html. It has been argued that this
portion of the proposed rule creates a similar but less effective version of the "first
day" motions in Chapter 11. "First-day" motions allow the DIP to get court approval
to make payments to certain creditors and employees so as to maximize the going
concern value of the debtor. Requiring the FDIC to vote to accomplish this same
objective may simply be a less effective version of "first-day" motions. Letter from
Stephen J. Lubben, Daniel J. Moore Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School
of Law, to Robert E. Feldman, Exec. Sec., Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., Re: 12 CFR 380,
Proposed Rules Implementing Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority (October
18, 2010) http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/20lO/lOcO4Orderliq.PDF. The
proposed rule also states that secured creditors will only have secured claims to the
extent they are collateralized, but that transactions secured by United States
government securities are going to be valued at par. The proposed rule clarifies that
all creditors should expect to suffer losses in a liquidation, and that no taxpayer
money may be used in these resolutions. Press Release, Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., PR224-2010, FDIC Board Issues Proposed Rule on Claims Process Under New
Resolution Authority (October 12, 2010)
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr0224.html.
163. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a)(2) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
164. Id. § 210(a)(3)(B). Once a claim has been accepted by the FDIC, the FDIC
may go ahead and make interim payments to that creditor. Id. § 210(a)(7).
165. See id. § 210(a)(2).
166. Id. § 210(a)(4).
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are made."' Similarly, Title II provides that any responsible
management or members of the board of directors will be
removed and all claims will be received and assessed by the
FDIC. ' Additionally, any portion of a secured claim that exceeds
the fair market value of the asset can be treated as an unsecured
claim.'
Under the Bankruptcy Code, claims are allowed in a
liquidation unless the Chapter 7 trustee objects in court and allows
the claimant to be heard on that objection.o Claims will only be
disallowed if the claimant fails to appear in court or if the court
determines that the claim should be disallowed."' Shareholders'
interests will be eliminated in bankruptcy, if the company is
insolvent.7 2 However, a solvent company's shareholders are
entitled to a distribution based on their equity, a protection not
Creditors can object to a
necessarily afforded under the OLA.
plan in bankruptcy proceedings and creditors in the same class can
vote down a proposed plan.174 However, the court may "cram
down" the plan, against creditor objections, if certain statutory
standards are met.
6. Claim Priorities
Title II creates a new system for the prioritization of
claims.'
While this system shares some commonality with the
Bankruptcy Code, it also leaves much uncertainty as to how
creditors' claims will be prioritized. The OLA is intended to be
exercised so that "creditors and shareholders will bear the losses of

167. CARPENTER R40530, supra note 59, at 8.
168. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 206, 210(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5386, 5390).
Claims decisions are reviewable in U.S. District Court, where the receiver's decision
is not accorded any deference. Id. § 210(a)(4) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
169. Id. § 210(a)(3)(D).
170. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).
171. 11 U.S.C. § 502.
172. Ayotte & Skeel, Jr., supra note 52, at 487-488.
173. Id.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 1126.
175. See id. § 1129(b).
176. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 210(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1475 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
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the financial company," and "the [FDIC] and other appropriate
agencies will take all steps ... to assure that all parties, including . .
. . third parties, having responsibility for the condition of the
financial company bear losses consistent with their responsibility. .
. .
Furthermore, Title II provides that "shareholders of a [CFC]
do not receive payment until after all other claims and the Fund
are fully paid."17 8
Claim priority is listed in Title II, with the administrative
expenses of the FDIC being first on the list. 79 Similarly situated
creditors are to be treated similarly, unless the FDIC determines
that it is in the best interest of the CFC to act otherwise.'8s The
FDIC can treat similarly situated creditors dissimilarly if it is
necessary to maximize the CFC's assets, to continue essential
operations, to maximize the return from the disposition of the
CFC's assets, or to minimize the loss resulting from the disposition
of the CFC's assets.8
In addition, Title II includes supplemental priorities, which
provide in part that creditors whose setoffs were destroyed by an
FDIC transfer of relevant assets and/or liabilities will be treated as
Furthermore, postsenior to general unsecured claims.182
receivership financing incurred by the FDIC on behalf of the CFC
is senior to administrative expenses. '" Under the OLA, proven
unsecured claims are only entitled to the recovery that would be
available in a hypothetically equivalent Chapter 7 bankruptcy.m

177. Id. § 204(a)(1), (3) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.

§ 5384).

178. Id. § 206(2) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5386).
179. Id. § 210(b)(1) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390). Unsecured claims will be
paid in the following order: (1) The FDIC's administrative expenses; (2) Debts owed
to the United States; (3) Wages earned by employees of the CFC; (4) Contributions
to employee benefit plans; (5) Any other "general or senior liability"; (6) Any debt
subordinated to general creditors; (7) Wages owed to senior executives and directors

of the CFC; and (8) Obligations to shareholders and other parties having equity in
the CFC. Id.

180. Id. § 210(b)(3)-(4).
181. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(b)(4) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5390).
182. Id. § 210(a)(12)(F).

183. Id. § 210(b)(2).
184. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 44. Payment of unsecured claims
in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy is done on a pro rata basis determined by the value
received from the liquidation of the assets. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2006).
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Under the Bankruptcy Code, "[1]egal priority, security
interests, and right of offset, where protected, jointly determine
what a creditor is entitled to under the law." 8' The administrative
costs of the bankruptcy are generally paid first.186 The Bankruptcy
Code lists several unsecured creditor classes that receive priority
status.'87 However, most unsecured creditors are grouped together
as general creditors." Secured creditors will typically have greater
recoveries than unsecured creditors because they will be paid the
full value of their secured claim, up to the value of their collateral,
and will be paid as an unsecured creditor on the portion of their
claim that is not secured.189 Creditors who provide DIP financing
will generally have priority over the pre-bankruptcy creditors.'" In
Chapter 11 bankruptcies, creditors are often paid in securities of
the reorganized entity.19'
The treatment of unsecured creditors and unsecured
portions of claims, the priority given to administrative expenses
and to DIP financing, as well as the priority given to financing
provided by the FDIC seem to provide comparable creditor
treatment under both Title II and the Bankruptcy Code.' 9'
However, the ability of the FDIC to deviate, in certain situations,
from the principle of treating similar creditors similarly, may harm
creditors' interests, and also inserts an element of uncertainty in
the OLA system of prioritization.'9 '

185. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 160.

186. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(C).
187. Id. § 507. These groups of preferred unsecured creditors include many types
of claims such as those for domestic support obligations, claims for contributions to
an employee benefit plan, and taxes owed. Id.
188. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 161.
189. See id. at 162.
190. See 11 U.S.C. § 363.
191. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 161. The prioritization of claims (and
their corresponding payout) is explicitly spelled out in the Bankruptcy Code for
Chapter 7 proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 726. However, in a Chapter 11 reorganization,
there is typically much more room for negotiation and modification of claims, leaving
more uncertainty and unpredictability as to what a particular creditor will recover.
Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 164.
192. See supra Part IV.B.6.
193. See SKADDEN, supra note 119, at 8; supra Part IV.B.6.
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7. Asset Disposition
The FDIC is directed to effectuate the liquidation so as to
maximize the value of the sale of assets while also mitigating
possible damage to the U.S. financial system. 94 As receiver, the
FDIC is empowered to sell off any assets to a third party for a fair
value.95 However, if such a purchaser cannot be found, the FDIC
may create a BFC to which it can transfer any parts of the business
worth preserving, without needing creditor approval, subject to a
The FDIC is to treat
creditor's minimal right of recovery.'9
similarly situated creditors similarly in transferring assets to a
7
However, it can deviate from this principle if it is
BFC.m
necessary to maximize value or to minimize losses from the
transfer.198 Creditors' recoveries are limited to what they would
have likely received in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.'" BFCs are meant
to be temporary entities that hold CFC assets until a private
acquisition is arranged." Thus, a BFC can last for two years,
subject to three one-year extensions. 20'
Title II allows the receiver to disaffirm contracts or leases
that detract from the interest of the receiver in any CFC assets
because the contract is burdensome or disaffirmance would
otherwise promote "orderly administration."202 This power applies
regardless of whether the contract or lease is executory.203
Damages for such repudiation are generally limited to actual,
compensatory damages.
The OLA will not accept oral contracts, but will allow
claims for any written agreement that was executed and confirmed
during the CFC's ordinary course of business and satisfactorily
194. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 210(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1460 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 210(h).
197. Id. § 210(h)(5)(E)(i)(III).
198. Id. § 210(h)(5)(E).
199. Id.
200. SKADDEN, supra note 119, at 12.
201. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(h)(12) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 5390).
202. Id. § 210(c).
203. Id. § 210(c)(1).
204. Id. § 210(c)(3)(A)(i).
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proven to the receiver.205 The consequence of this provision is that
creditors' legitimate oral agreements may be disaffirmed by the
FDIC. Additionally, the FDIC has the authority to distribute leftbehind assets, including those from the sale of the business, to
creditors, in the fashion that it sees fit.206
Bankruptcy proceedings are largely guided by the actions
of creditors and other interested parties who influence
reorganizations, have standing to be represented in the bankruptcy
proceeding, and can object to proposed confirmation plans.207
Furthermore, either a trustee or a DIP is typically overseeing
disposition of the assets, which automatically become property of
the estate at the time of filing.208 A DIP will usually be required to
get court approval to dispose of any assets out of the ordinary
course of business.209
In addition to the general provisions for asset disposition,
in bankruptcy, the only contracts which may be rejected are
Damages are
executory contracts and unexpired leases. 210
law.2 n
non-bankruptcy
under
of
contract
as
breaches
calculated
The Bankruptcy Code will allow claims based on oral agreements
if the contract is proven under applicable non-bankruptcy law. 21 2
Several provisions of Title II dealing with asset disposition
are particularly ominous for creditors. 213 For example, the FDIC's
ability to disaffirm certain burdensome contracts obviously poses a
threat to affected creditors.2 14 Additionally, the FDIC's ability to
defeat certain claims against its interests as well as unverified oral
agreements is another possible pitfall for creditors.215 The FDIC's
power to transfer assets and liabilities to a BFC, subject to minimal
creditor recovery, may treat same-class creditors differently, and
DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 44, at 29.
206. Id. at 27.
207. CARPENTER R40530, supra note 59, at 8.

205.

208. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 541 (2006).
209. See id. § 363.

210. Id. § 365. Rejection must be accompanied by approval from the Bankruptcy
Court. Id.
211. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
See supra Part IV.B.7.
See supra Part IV.B.7.
See supra Part IV.B.7.

LLP, supra note 44, at 29.
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may treat junior creditors as ahead of certain senior creditors.216
Several of these provisions lack concise guidelines and parameters,
leaving room for arbitrary and unfair treatment of creditors.
Finally, the FDIC method lacks a judge who often must approve
the disposition of assets and in certain cases a trustee who serves
as an uninterested third party in effectuating and overseeing the
217
disposition of assets.
8. The Option of Chapter 11 Reorganization
There is no option for reorganization of a CFC under the
OLA. However, the FDIC does have broad authority to sell off
assets of the CFC to private acquirers. 21 9 Furthermore, this can be
accomplished without any notice or consent from creditors or
shareholders, and is not subject to challenge as a fraudulent
conveyance. 220 The FDIC can also arrange for the acquisition of
the CFC by a private acquirer, and these acquisitions can be
accomplished without the consent of creditors and shareholders.2 21
Through Chapter 11, the Bankruptcy Code provides for a
222
means of restructuring failing firms. Firms which may perceive a
restructuring to be feasible and thus could have protected the
interests of their creditors through a successful debt restructuring
and reorganization of the company will not have this option under
the OLA. 2 23 The Bankruptcy Code requires that interested parties
receive notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as court
approval, before a company in bankruptcy is sold.2 24 Also, a
reorganization is generally only possible if creditors approve the
218

216. See supra Part IV.B.7.

217. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 364, 704 (2006).
218. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 214, 124 Stat. 1376, 1518 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5394).
219. SKADDEN, supra note 119, at 12.
220. Dodd-Frank Act § 210(a), (e) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390).
221. Id. § 210(h)(2).
222. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.
223. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201, 203 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381, 5383).

However, if an entity has been designated a CFC and placed in FDIC receivership,
the decision has already been previously made that a reorganization was not the
better option; supra Section IV.A.
224. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(b), (f).
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plan and the Bankruptcy Court has found that the plan meets
225
On the other hand, a strict liquidation
various requirements.
regime may be quicker than reorganization, and that the fact that
reorganization is not an option may decrease moral hazard.226
9. Oversight Structure
Once an financial company has received CFC designation
and been placed in FDIC receivership, the OLA will be carried
out in largely administrative fashion, with the FDIC having great
discretionary powers in deciding when and if to commence a
liquidation, as well as in determining how to liquidate the assets of
the CFC, and how to manage the company while it acts as
221
receiver. It is uncertain whether the FDIC will have the proper
expertise to efficiently resolve CFCs. 2 28 Additionally, the FDIC, as
administrator, has a financial interest in the resolution and will
function in a self-serving manner to some extent, in order to pay
itself as a senior creditor.229 Judicial review of the FDIC's actions
and their handling of creditors' claims will be limited, and damages
arising therefrom will likely also be limited. 230
By contrast, bankruptcy proceedings involve judges and
courtrooms, creditors and debtors who are usually represented by
lawyers, a trustee (who has a fiduciary duty to the creditors) who is
often handling the disposition of the assets or the management of
the ongoing business, and most decisions are appealable to a
higher court.23 ' In a Chapter 11 reorganization, creditors and
management often remain largely in control of the company and
its assets.

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. §§ 1123, 1125, 1129.
See supra Part IV.B.8.
CARPENTER R40530, supra note 59, at 6-7.
See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 74, at 143, 174.
See id.
See supra Parts IV.B.6-8.
CARPENTER R40530,supra note 59, at 8.
See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006).
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V. CONCLUSION
It is premature to say exactly what the effect and
implications of Title II of the Dodd Frank Act will be for creditors.
Particularly, it is impossible to know how often and to what extent
this provision will be utilized. If the intent really is to have
bankruptcy remain the preferred option, then perhaps creditors'
rights will remain unaffected by Title II, and we will see more
bankruptcies carried out like Lehman, and less government
assistance provided to failing firms like Bear Stearns.233 On the
other hand, it is not yet clear how assertive the FDIC will be in
effectuating the OLA. It is possible that predictions that Title II
merely provides statutory authority for more bailouts will prove
true.? Without knowing these answers, creditors will not have
clear expectations as to when and which institutions will be bailed
out or liquidated by the FDIC, or either liquidated or reorganized
in Bankruptcy. Much will depend on the actions taken by the
Federal Government and the FDIC in the near future. Creditors
should pay close attention to government actions including rule
proposals and rulemakings, statements by Treasury and FDIC
officials, any CFC designations, and ultimately any liquidations, to
discern exactly how Title II will be effectuated. Creditors should
cautiously evaluate risks and make investments according to those
government actions and the resulting expectations for future
government action.
Despite this uncertainty, the discussions in Congress prior
to the enactment of Dodd-Frank, a closer look at the Lehman
bankruptcy, the language of Title II, and a comparison of that
language to Bankruptcy Code provisions, lead to the conclusion
that the OLA is not, and is not intended to be, protective of
creditors' rights and interests.235 Creditors should be wary of the
new OLA. Accordingly, at least a temporary reevaluation of their
lending strategies is in order. This includes a careful look at the
riskiness of their loans, the type of credit instruments they hold,
and the possibility that they are lending to a potential CFC. These
233. See supra Part II.B.1.
234. See supra Part II.B.1.
235. See supra Parts II, III, IV.
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evaluations should be made with an eye towards steering clear of
holding potential claims against a financial company that may end
up under the control of an FDIC receiver. In light of the lack of
protection for creditors under the OLA, creditors need to either
lend to systemically significant institutions that are more
financially sound, or they need to avoid extending credit to
systemically significant financial institutions altogether.
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